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give full faith and credit to J-l's determination in light of other factors
indicating a strong state policy such as the amount of property located
in J-2 and the amount of taxes involved.
It appears that Durfee, rather than eliminating factor e of the Restatement formula, has merely concluded that the underlying policy favoring
collateral attack was not strong enough on the facts presented. It is submitted that Durfee, rather than dismembering collateral attack, limits the
finality of jurisdictional determinations where certain strong policy reasons
exist. In so doing, it appears the Supreme Court has adopted the balance
factors of the Restatement.
William B. Freilich

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CIVIL

RIGHTS ACT-INVASION OF PRIVACY

BY POLICE GIVES RISE TO A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE FEDERAL

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT.

York v. Story (9th Cir. 1963)
Plaintiff brought an action under the federal Civil Rights Act alleging
that a city police officer caused the plaintiff, who had come to the police
station to complain of an assault, to be photographed in indecent positions
over her objections. She further alleged that such defendant and another
officer, circulated the photographs among police personnel and in so doing
were liable under the Civil Rights Act' for invasion of her privacy. The
district court dismissed the action, but the Ninth Circuit reversed holding
that the complaint stated a cause of action since a person's right of privacy
is comprehended within the "liberty" of which one may not be deprived
without due process of law and, therefore, the police officers, acting under
color of law, had deprived plaintiff of a constitutionally protected right.
York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963).
A complaint states a claim under section 1979 of the Civil Rights Act
if the facts alleged show that the defendant: (1) while acting under color
of state or local authority, (2) deprives a person of any rights, privileges
1. The applicable provision of the Civil Rights Act was originally enacted as a

part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. It was later reenacted as
positive law, as Rxv. STAT. § 1979 (1875). It appears in 42 U.S.C. as § 1983. But
since Title 42 has not been enacted into positive law, it is only "prima facie evidence
of the law." 1 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1958). The reference throughout this note will,
therefore, be to § 1979, meaning Riv. STAT. § 1979 (1875).
Rzv. STAT. § 1979 reads: Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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or immunities secured to the individual by the Constitution and laws of
the United States.2 In light of United States v. Classic3 and Screws v.
United States,4 the facts alleged in a complaint are sufficient with regard
to the first of these elements if they show that defendants were clothed
with state authority. 5 It is clear that in the instant case the defendants
were acting under color of state law. 6 The second and more complex
problem is whether privacy is a constitutionally protected right within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 It was first suggested as being
protected in a famous article by Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren
8
written in 1890 which remains the classic on the subject. However, since the
right is not enumerated in the Constitution, if it exists as such, it must be
implied from the language of the Constitution and the amendments thereto.
There are two possible sources from which the right could be implied.
The first is the Fourth Amendment 9 search and seizure provision as it
applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The second is
10
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which protects the
rights of "life, liberty and property" against infringement. The Ninth
Circuit's opinion in the instant case demonstrated no close analysis of
either source. It apparently dismissed the possibility of there being a
right to privacy implicit under the Fourth Amendment since it went no
farther than to state that even if there were a search and seizure, that
finding would not be dispositive of the case as to the defendants who had
only distributed the pictures. It accepted the proposition that without a
search and seizure there could be no actionable right. As to the Fourteenth
Amendment, the court stated in only general terms that privacy was
encompassed in "liberty" which must be protected. A closer analysis will
demonstrate that the court was perhaps correct in result, but not completely
correct in reasoning.
An early case, Boyd v. United States," dealing with the meaning to
be given to the Fourth Amendment, employed language which would seem
to resolve the problem. In Boyd, the Supreme Court held invalid a law
2. Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639, 646 (9th Cir. 1962); Cohen v. Norris,
300 F.2d 24, 30 (9th Cir. 1962).

3. 313 U.S. 229, 61 S.Ct. 1031 (1941).
4. 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031 (1945).
5. "Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law, and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law is action taken under
color of state law." United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031,
1043 (1941).
6. Ibid.
7. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
8. Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. RZv. 193 (1890).
9. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. See note 7 supra.
11. 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524 (1886).
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requiring one to produce books, papers, and invoices in a suit for violation
of the revenue laws. Though technically there was not a search and seizure,
the Court reasoned that, based on the principle laid down in Entick v.
Carrington,12 the Fourth Amendment should not be technically and literally
applied. The substance of this opinion was that the Fourth Amendment
protects arbitrary intrusion upon privacy, whether of the home or the person.
It was not until 1928 that the Supreme Court retreated from this
liberal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. The famous or perhaps
infamous case of Olmstead v. United States13 involved a conviction based
on evidence procured by the use of wire tapping. The petitioners specifically
argued that Boyd v. United States, Ex Parte Jackson,14 and other leading
cases "uniformly hold that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were designed
primarily to protect personal rights, one of the most valuable of which
is the right of privacy."' 15 The argument did not prevail. Chief Justice
Taft, delivering the opinion of the majority, held that the wire tapping
was not a search and seizure because the search referred to in the Fourth
Amendment must "be of material things - the person, the house, his
papers or his effects."' 6 The determinative element was the lack of trespass.
The Chief Justice further explained that on the authority of Carrol v.
United States17 the Fourth Amendment is only to be applied to what was
deemed an unreasonable search and seizure at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted. Brandeis and Stone were the only dissenters who would
give a liberal interpretation to the amendment: "Clauses guaranteeing to
the individual protection against specific abuses of power must have a
similar capacity of adaptation to a changing world ....
18
Opinions subsequent to Olmstead have been sympathetic with the
proponents of a liberal interpretation, but have refused to digress from the
rationale of Olmstead. In Goldman v. United States"9 it was held that
section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 193420 did not apply
to a case where a third person overhears a conversation in an adjoining
room by means of a detectaphone. 2 1 Petitioners then argued that Olmstead
should be reversed and the Fourth Amendment applied to cover such a
situation. A majority of the Court refused to agree, stating that the case
was the result of a ".

.

. prolonged consideration by this court." 22 Later,

in 1952, the Supreme Court decided On Lee v. United States.23 The
12. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765).
13. 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564 (1928).

14. 96 U.S. 727 (1878).

15. Brief for Petitioners Green et al., p. 14; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.

438, 48 S.Ct. 564 (1928).

16. Id. at 464, 48 S.Ct. at 568.
17. 267 U.S. 132, 149, 45 S.Ct. 280, 284 (1925).
18. 277 U.S. at 472, 48 S.Ct. at 570.
19. 316 U.S. 129, 62 S.Ct. 993 (1942).
20. 48 Stat. § 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958).
21. A detectaphone is a telephonic apparatus with an attached microphone transmitter used especially for listening secretly.
22. 316 U.S. 129, 135, 62 S.Ct. 993, 996.
23. 343 U.S. 747, 72 S.Ct. 967 (1952).
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conviction was based on evidence obtained through a secret transmitting
device. Again with four dissents the court refused to overrule Olmstead.
More recently in the case of Silverman v. United States24 the Court refused
to overrule or even consider Olmstead. Instead, the Court reasoned that
since the microphone used by the police to eavesdrop was contained in
a nail-like object which was driven into a heating duct, there was a technical
trespass and thus a search within the Fourth Amendment sense.
These cases would seem to indicate that unless there is a physical
search and seizure in conjunction with the violation of the person's privacy,
the latter right is not constitutionally protected. It must be noted, however,
that all the cases cited above raise the constitutional problem in the criminal
context. In the civil sense, the scope of the Fourth Amendment has never
been determined except in a typical search and seizure situation, although
the existence of a civil cause of action for its breach is acknowledged and
was the basis for refusing to hold evidence unconstitutionally obtained
inadmissible in a state court.25 It was not until Mapp v. Ohio26 held that
the civil action was not effective to adequately protect the right that such
evidence was held inadmissible.
When the question is raised in a criminal case, the object of the
argument is to have the evidence suppressed. The petitioner is rarely
interested in whether his right of privacy has been invaded and is interested
only in whether the evidence will be used against him or not. Once
excluded, he is normally satisfied. In a civil action, on the other hand, the
emphasis is totally different. The plaintiff is interested in being compensated for the injury that he has suffered. It is submitted that the
substance of the right against search and seizure as contained in the Fourth
Amendment, is, in the civil sense, the right of privacy, the right to be
secure in house and person. If the substance of this right is violated, it
should be immaterial what form the violation takes. Though there may be
good reasons why a technical search and seizure may be required in a
criminal case before the Fourth Amendment may be imposed to deny
otherwise relevant, material and incriminating evidence to the state courts,
these considerations are not present in the civil area. If the basic right
protected is the right of privacy, and a plain reading of the amendment
seems to support that implication, it seems that the court in the instant
case was correct in applying the liberal interpretation as laid down in
27
the cases of Entick v. Carrington
and Boyd v. United States28 to this
civil case, and denying the application of the interpretation as laid down
in criminal cases such as Olmstead.
Notwithstanding these arguments, however, it must be noted that
the Supreme Court has never so held. Since there is no definitive opinion
24. 365 U.S. 505, 81 S.Ct. 679 (1961).

25. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359 (1949). The civil action would
be trespass which would be based on state law as well as the constitutional right.
26. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961).
27. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765).
28. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524 (1886).
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in this area in a civil case, the opinions handed down by the Court in the
criminal area must control. Thus, unless the breach of privacy is accompanied by an unreasonable search and seizure, it would seem that there is
no constitutional protection of the right. The contrary argument was
specifically made in Olmstead and denied. However, the Mapp decision
has severely undermined some of the basic tenets of Olmstead, and it is
probable that this much criticized decision would not completely survive
another attack. The tenor of the Mapp opinion was that the Fourth
Amendment should be liberally interpreted. Justice Black explained most
clearly the Court's feeling: "I fully agree with Mr. Justice Bradley's opinion
that the two Amendments [Fourth and Fifth] upon which the Boyd
doctrine rests are ...both entitled to a liberal rather than a niggardly
'29
interpretation.
The second possible source of the right is the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of due process. It can be argued that privacy is part
of "life, liberty and property" protected against government interference
by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in On Lee v. United States" said "To approve
legally what we disapprove morally on the ground of practical inconvenience is to yield to a short-sighted view of practicality." 3' Mr. Justice
Douglas is an even stronger proponent of the right of privacy. 32 Dean
Roscoe Pound and Professor Charles Nutting are of the opinion that
privacy should be a right protected under the Fourteenth Amendment's
"liberty." Professor Nutting argues: "The way to .protect privacy is to
recognize the interest for what it is. . . .It is an interest which should
receive protection as a 'liberty'.13 3 Dean Pound is as forceful: "The right
was discovered by reason, developed by reason, and is limited by reason.
Thus it is within the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment. ... Y34
It is submitted that while the Fourth Amendment protects the right
of privacy only to the extent that a search and seizure can be found, there
is no such limitation upon protection of the right under the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, to date, there has not been a strong argument
made to the Supreme Court that either life, liberty or property as expressed
in the Fourteenth Amendment, embraces the right of privacy. It would
seem ludicrous, however, to constitutionally protect one's home from arbitrary invasion, yet afford no protection for the invasion of his personal
privacy, especially if the violation involves exposing a naked body.
State courts when faced with the problem have usually justified the
right on the theory that it "came from Natural Law" 35 or it is embraced by
29. 367 U.S. 643, 666, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1697 (1961).
30. 343 U.S. 747, 72 S.Ct, 967 (1952).
31. Id.at 758, 72 S.Ct.at 974 (1952).
32. See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in On Lee v. United States,
343 U.S. 747, 762, 72 S.Ct. 967, 976 (1952).
33. Nutting, The Fifth Amendment and Privacy, 18 U. PTr. L. Rsv. 533,
543 (1957).
34. Pound, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Right of Privacy, 13 W. Rzs.

L. Rzv. 34, 54 (1961).

35. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
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"liberty." 3 6 The feeling expressed by the state courts is that a right to be
let alone is basic and fundamental to an orderly system of law. In respect
to the Fourteenth Amendment there is no direct authority to support the
instant case. On the other hand, there is no reason to say the case is wrong.
Such a situation has never before presented itself to a federal court. Consequently, the court of appeals has taken a bold but laudable step.
Though the right of privacy did not exist at common law, 37 this does
not necessarily mean that the right cannot now be protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 3 The Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co. 39 held that the amendment was couched in such broad
language as to allow various applications of the terms life and liberty. In
40
Rochin v. California
it was stated that the judicial exercise of judgment
cannot be avoided by freezing due process of law at some fixed time or
stage, and in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,41 the Court
said that "due process unlike some legal rules is not a technical conception
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. ' 42 Thug
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses all that
is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty '43 whether the right was so
protected when the Constitution was written or not. The questions to be
answered then are whether the "concept of ordered liberty" encompasses
the right of privacy standing alone or whether it will be protected if the
method of violation was of a particularly shocking nature.
It seems very doubtful that the right of privacy as such will be
protected under the- Fourteenth Amendment. As previously stated, the
right was not protected at common law, and there is little indication that
the thinking of the Court has so changed as to now include the right in
the "concept of ordered liberty." However, in light of the expansion of
due process, and the inclination of the Court to apply its sanction to new
situations, it cannot be said that the right of privacy will never be protected
in a given situation.
In Rochin v. California,4 4 the Supreme Court was faced with what
began as the typical search and seizure case. State officers forced their
way into a private house on the basis of some information that the accused
36. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931); Pavesich v. New
England Life Ins: Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); Barber v. Time, Inc., 348
Mo.1153, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
37. Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. Rzv. 193, 213 (1890).
38. This view was also espoused in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373,
30 S.Ct. 544, 551 (1909): "Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions
and purposes. Therefore, a principle to be vital, must be capable of wider application
than the mischief which gave it birth."
39. 272 U.S. 365, 387, 47 S.Ct. 114, 118 (1926).
40. 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205 (1952).
41. 341 U.S. 123, 71 S.Ct. 624 (1951).
42. Id. at 162, 71 S.Ct. at 643.
43. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152 (1937) : Mr. Justice
Cardozo, speaking for the majority held that the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses
all that is ". . . implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
44. 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205 (1952).
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was selling narcotics, in an attempt to obtain evidence and make an arrest.
Had their purposes been achieved without doing more, there would have
been little controversy since the case was decided before Mapp v. Ohio45
rendered inadmissible evidence thus gained in a state court proceeding.
However, when the accused saw the police, he swallowed the capsules
which were the objects of the search. It was then necessary for the police
to forcibly attempt to extract the capsules and, failing there, to have the
accused's stomach pumped at a hospital. The incriminating evidence was
thus obtained and was the basis of the conviction. The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction on the ground that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was violated. Mr. Justice Frankfurter summarized the view the Court took of the police conduct as follows: "This
is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy
of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was
there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents - this course of
proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend
even hardened sensibilities. ' ' 46 (Emphasis added.)

It is true that Rochin involved a earch and seizure. But the right to
have evidence illegally obtained by state officers held inadmissible in a
state court proceeding was not then available to the defendant. The right
was protected, and the evidence was excluded solely because the police
conduct shocked the conscience.
In the instant case, there may have been no search and seizure. 47 But
on the facts of the case it would seem that nude photographs, taken over
the objections of the plaintiff, are certainly as shocking as stomach pumping.
It may be that the Supreme Court would not reach the same conclusion on
the facts. However, since the action cannot be dismissed "unless it appears
beyond reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief, '48 it seems that the
court was correct in reversing the dismissal of the instant action. Whether
the relief prayed for is for a violation of "privacy" or "integrity" or some
other term, if the conduct of the police which caused the injury is "shocking"
in the constitutional sense, it is cognizable under the Civil Rights Act.
Since it does not appear as a matter of law that the alleged acts in the
instant case fall below that standard, the Ninth Circuit was correct in
reversing the dismissal.
John E. Good
45. 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961).
46. 342 U.S. 165, 172,72 S.Ct. 205, 209 (1952).
47. The issue of a search and seizure was raised in the instant case. The court
treated it by saying: "The alleged act of Story in taking photographs of appellant
in the nude, if proved, may or may not constitute an unreasonable search in the
Fourth Amendment sense. But if we should hold that it does, this would not dispose
of the whole case for the alleged subsequent acts of Story and Moreno in distributing
prints of these photographs, of which appellant also complains, could hardly be
characterized as unreasonable searches." York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 454 (1963).
48. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02 (1957).
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